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THE POLITICAL GEOGRAPHY OF ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: 
IMPLEMENTING THE WATER FRAMEWORK DIRECTIVE IN THE DOURO 
RIVER BASIN, PORTUGAL  
 
 
''Why did we become blind, I don't know, perhaps one day 
we'll find out, Do you want me to tell you what I think, Yes, 
do, I don't think we did go blind, I think we are blind, Blind 
but seeing, Blind people who can see, but do not see.'' 




 The adoption of the Water Framework Directive (WFD) by the member states of 
the European Union in 2000 was considered a milestone in the history of environmental 
regulation not just in Europe, but around the world. Because of the combination of 
environmental targets, economic safeguards and social sensitivity, the approval of the 
WFD has been described as a major step forward in the contemporary search for better 
environmental regulation and water management, as can be seen in its justification by the 
European Commission (2011):  
 
“The increasing demand by citizens and environmental organisations for cleaner rivers and 
lakes, groundwater and coastal beaches has been evident for considerable time. (...) This 
demand by citizens is one of the main reasons why the Commission has made water 
protection one of the priorities of its work. The new European Water Policy will get 
polluted waters clean again, and ensure clean waters are kept clean. (...) European Water 
Policy has undergone a thorough restructuring process, and a new Water Framework 
Directive adopted in 2000 will be the operational tool, setting the objectives for water 
protection for the future.”  
 
However, since its first years of implementation, it has become increasingly evident 
that old practices and institutional barriers affect the renovation of water policies and 
management approaches (Ioris, 2008a). This paper examines the shortcomings of the 
translation of the WFD into policy-making in the Portuguese section of the Douro River 
Basin, which is shared between Portugal and Spain. In order to understand the 
possibilities of the new water legislation, it is first examined the evolution of water use 
and regulation in the river basin according to a suggested classification into five 
successive phases. The new institutional context, after the approval of the Portuguese 
water law, which translated the WFD into national legislation in 2005, is then examined, 
taking into account the reactions and expectations of different sectors of water users. To a 
large extent, the public debate about the new water regulatory regime has been dominated 
by the controversial introduction of bulk water charges and the calculation of the 
monetary cost of mitigation measures. The empirical findings demonstrate the uneven 
results of the institutional reforms in the river basin and provide important lessons about 
the implementation of the WFD and, ultimately, the shortcomings of state action. Among 
those lessons, it is very clear that a significant proportion of water users remain sceptical 
about the ultimate objectives and beneficiaries of the new water regulatory approach, 
which suggests that the new regulatory framework needs to be improved in order to 
respond to wider social and political demands. 
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WATER MANAGEMENT AND THE POLITICS OF STATE INTERVENTIONS 
 
The allocation, use and conservation of water are more than simply technical and 
physical interventions, but also encapsulate conflicting values and complex interactions 
between social groups and politico-economic sectors. Particularly in regions with dense 
population and intense economic activities, such as Western Europe, the management of 
water reserves and aquatic ecosystems represents a major challenge for the public and 
private sectors alike. Mounting pressures and conflicting demands have called for 
improved regulatory approaches capable of solving water related conflicts and preserving 
the integrity of water systems. At the same time, changes in water use and conservation 
policies can provide a unique opportunity for dealing with emerging threats and 
environmental risks.  
In the context of the European Union (henceforth, EU), established in the 1950s 
and now including 27 member states, the growing complexity of water management 
corresponds to one of the main chapters of environmental policy, legislation and 
regulation. The public sector, which in the EU extends from local authorities (of different 
sizes and operational structures) to national states (with significant territorial, economic 
and population disparities) and, eventually, the interstate administrative structure (i.e. 
European Commission, European Parliament, Council of Ministers and Court of Justice), 
is increasingly required to demonstrate leadership, exert fairness and foster innovation in 
water management and technology. These are demanding tasks that have largely defined 
the agenda of water regulation in the last decades. Since the early years of European 
unification, EU member states have operated according to a shared, multiscale and often 
burdensome type of statehood, where successive plans and regulatory efforts have 
attempted to improve the institutional mechanisms for dealing with water management 
problems (Grimeaud, 2001). In practice, though, the end result has largely been ‘an 
organised anarchy’, especially because of the failure to deal with competing interests, 
inadequate technologies and insufficient public participation (Richardson, 1994). 
Habermas (1991)  draws attention to  the contradictions of the European State due to the 
requirement to become more inclusive at the same time that it loses its ability to operate 
effectively as a ‘rational’ entity.  
The introduction of the ‘WFD regime’ (i.e. the range of national legislation, 
official norms and technical procedures related to the implementation of the WFD across 
the EU) has been often described as an opportunity to enhance the environmental 
commitments of national governments and public agencies, as well as a central tool for 
promoting new networks and integrating development planning with environmental 
management (Howe and White, 2002). At the same time, the implementation of the new 
Directive has been fraught with new challenges and shortcomings, such as the tendency 
of non-compliance and accommodation to the requirements of WFD among some 
member states (Liefferink et al., 2011), difficulties with defining regulatory standards and 
securing additional resources (Kanakoudis and Tsitsifli, 2010), as well as with the lack of 
commitment, leadership, public involvement and transparency (Andersson et al., 2012; 
Gouldson et al., 2008; Watson et al., 2009). WFD regulators have typically made use of 
only a narrow sub-set of regulatory options that basically replicate their previous (pre-
WFD) approaches, which happens because of resource constraints, lack of scientific data 
and institutional inertia, among other factors (Kirk et al., 2007). 
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Despite the important academic investigation carried out on the implementation of 
the WFD regime, such as those just mentioned, it is critical to recognise that most 
scholars interested in water regulatory reforms still understand the public sector as a 
consistent, predetermined entity put in charge, on behalf of the whole society, of 
mediating water demands and environmental impacts. In that sense, the majority of the 
analyses concentrate on the adjustments required to attain the supposedly consensual and 
innovative properties of the new water regulation. At the same time, they also insist on 
the advantages of the pragmatic, market-oriented policy-making pursued by the EU state 
apparatus. Consequently, a large proportion of the discussion about the new water 
legislation has struggled to explain the deeper dilemmas faced by the European public 
sector and the unexpected reactions of social and economic sectors. The reductionist 
conceptualisations of the role of the state and of its contested environmental agenda have 
constituted a main obstacle for the proper examination of the outcomes and the prospects 
of new water regulatory arrangements. Such approaches neglect the fact that water 
regulation unfolds through the prioritisation of some politico-institutional demands in a 
way that inscribes the balance of power in the management of water itself (Ioris, 2012). 
Whereas the agencies of the state play a leading role in the assessment of environmental 
problems and in the formulation of water management responses, the work of the state 
also reflects multiple internal contradictions and political clashes (Poulantzas, 1978). 
Environmental problems, such as water management failures, need to be reinterpreted as 
the product of the uneven balance of power and the intricate socionatural relationships 
that permeate, and are influenced by, the state.  
Our main objective here is to examine how the reorganisation of the water 
regulatory functions of the Portuguese State that follows the introduction of WFD has 
affected the interpretation of problems and the rationale of responses. Although the new 
legal framework is still in its first stages of implementation (i.e. mitigation measures need 
to be in place by 2015), the intention is to critically understand the overall direction of 
WFD regulation in the Douro. It will be discussed below that, so far, the introduction of 
new regulation in the region has had limited and ambiguous outcomes, given that the 
attempts to induce environmental restoration through economic growth and monetised 
relations have led to renewed conflicts and widespread resentment. At the same time that 
the WFD regime has enlarged the technical and institutional for dealing with water 
problems in Portugal, there has been modest public involvement (Thiel, 2010) and most 
activity has been a combination of hydraulic engineering and neo-liberal market 
governance (Lopes, 2009). In order to investigate those issues in the Douro, the text is 
organised as follows: the next two sections describe the area of study and the 
methodological approach, and situate WFD as the final stage in the long history of 
institutional reforms. The specific achievements and failures of the WFD in the Douro 
will be then discussed making reference to the perceptions of different social groups. The 
text ends with some concluding observations and recommendations. 
 
AREA OF STUDY AND METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH 
 
The controversies related to the introduction of the Water Framework Directive in 
the European Union will be considered through a study of the regulatory experience in 
the Portuguese section of the Douro River Basin. The present analysis also tries to 
respond to the provocative observation by Dominguez et al. (2004) that water 
management issues of the Douro have been often hidden from the public debate. The 
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Douro is the largest Iberian river basin (97,290 km2), split between Spain and Portugal 
(Sabater et al., 2009), as can be seen in Figure 1 (the same rive is also called Duero in 
Spain). In terms of length, it is the third longest river in the Iberian Peninsula (927 km), 
flowing from the Urbion Hills in Spain to the city of Oporto (Porto in Portuguese) at the 
Atlantic Ocean (INAG, 2001). Water use in the river basin is primarily for agriculture 
purposes (particularly in the Spanish section) and, secondly, for hydroelectricity 
generation (more than half of Portuguese generation is located in the Douro). Industries, 
cities, navigation and mining are also important user sectors (INAG, 2007). Because of 
untreated effluents coming from Spain, at the point the Douro enters Portugal the level of 
pollution (nitrates in particular) is considerably high (LMNOS, 2000). The ecological 
condition is further degraded by irrigation abstraction, urban effluents, impoundments 
and riparian deforestation, which means that a significant proportion of the Portuguese 
river basin has chemical and biological parameters at levels above the legal thresholds 
(ARHN, 2011; INAG, 2001).  
There have been persistent obstacles to integrate policies and management 
between Portugal and Spain, which constitutes an additional challenge now that WFD 
requires formal cooperation in river basin districts. Some modest collaboration was 
achieved with the signing of the Albufeira Convention in 1998, which determined that 
Spain had to guarantee a minimal annual volume of water at several points along the 
Douro River. In practice, however, Spain has breached the Convention in several 
occasions, such as during the droughts of 2001-2002 and 2004-2005 when the agreed 
provisions were not observed. The Convention was amended in 2008 and Spain is now 
supposed to maintain more detailed (weekly and quarterly) river flows. 
 
 
Figure 1 – The Douro River Basin in Portugal 
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In order to understand the achievements and prospects of the ongoing institutional 
changes, fieldwork was carried out in 2008-2009. Forty three in-depth interviews were 
conducted and various public events related to WFD and regional economic development 
were attended. Interviews were transcribed, coded and analysed in Portuguese and only 
the extracts reproduced in this paper were translated into English. The research started 
with the consideration of sub-units of the Douro catchment and then scaled them up to 
identify common water policy patterns at higher scales. The study initially included 
interviews with water users, public authorities, activists and academics involved with 
water regulation and policy-making. Interview respondents were purposely selected from 
an array of organisations that represented multiple interests in the water management 
sector, environmental conservation and regional development. Based on this preliminary 
information, a database of public and non-governmental sectors was developed, which 
guided further interviews, the analysis of documentation and the collection of background 
information. This approach aimed to provide a representative illustration of the 
controversies, alliances and disputes that underpin the implementation of the new 
Directive. Secondary data and water management information were obtained in the 
libraries of the universities of Porto, Coimbra, Lisbon, Valladolid and Salamanca, in the 
council libraries of Vila Real, Miranda do Douro and Peso da Régua, and from the 
National Water Institute (INAG) in Lisbon. Follow up contacts and consultation of policy 
documents continued over a two years period and the later stages of the writing coincided 
with the public consultation, at the end of 2011, on the mitigation measures need to 
achieve WFD objectives.  
 
REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT, WATER USES AND THE IMPLEMENATION OF 
THE WATER FRAMEWORK DIRECTIVE IN THE DOURO 
 
 For centuries, the management of the River Douro and its tributaries has played a 
strategic role in the economic development of the North of Portugal and in its commercial 
integration with other European nations. The daily practices of regional groups, and their 
interaction with other national and international regions, have helped to change the river 
basin in highly dynamic and politicised processes (Ioris, 2008b). The upper reaches of the 
river have become the electric powerhouse of the country after the construction of a 
cascade of hydropower schemes, whilst the lower sections have been associated with 
industrial production, the transport of goods and significant urbanisation. Since the 
entrance of Portugal into the European Union in 1986, the region has experienced intense 
socioeconomic transformations, which has had considerable repercussions in terms of 
environmental regulation and also water management. On the one hand, there have been 
investments in infrastructure, tourism and in various forms of cultural and social 
integration. On the other hand, the region has struggled to compete with foreign imports 
(AEP, 2006) and the advance of neoliberal economic policies has reinforced 
macroeconomic imbalances (Estanque and Mendes, 1997). In that context, the 
introduction of the WFD in Portugal is an integral part of the search for an alternative to 
regional development approaches and for improved standards of natural resources 
management. 
 
Evolution of water use and regulation  
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In schematic terms, it is possible to identify at least five different periods in the 
recent history of water use and regulation that culminate in the current implementation of 
WFD. Needless to say, these five phases are directly connected with broader political and 
economic changes taking place in Portugal and in Europe at large. First, the pre-
industrial period, until the early 20th century, during which the main economic activities 
related to the Douro River were boat navigation and the transport of wine from the Peso 
da Régua region, in the middle section of the catchment, to the Porto docks (Pereira, 
2008). The first hydropower generation scheme in Portugal was installed in a Douro 
tributary in 1894 (Leitão, 2005), which anticipated the expansion of hydroelectricity in 
the following decades. As had been the case in previous centuries, in the middle of the 
19th century the supply of water to the city of Porto still depended on public fountains, 
water sellers and private wells (Pereira, 2008). However, in the 1880s, the responsibility 
for water supply was transferred to a French concessionary company, the Compagnie 
Générale des Eaux pour l'Étranger, which operated a small, but pioneering, water 
treatment plant in the Sousa River, a tributary of the Douro, to serve the metropolitan area 
of Porto (Amorim and Pinto, 2001). 
 
 
Figure 2 – Old water fountain in Oporto and amateur fisherman in the lower Douro. 
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The second phase can be labelled the state hydraulic period (1919-1986), 
following the approval of the Water Law of 1919 that normalised the private and public 
management of water (Cunha et al., 1980). The Law stipulated that large interventions 
required prior authorisation from the state (which was later confirmed by the Decree No. 
468 of 1971). The government that followed the 1926 military insurgency cancelled the 
contract with the French concessionary and the water services of Porto were 
municipalised. In 1940, the Zebreiros well field, a gravel water extraction site located 
near the Douro River, started to operate in order to increase water supply to the 
metropolitan area. This second phase largely coincided with the dictatorship that ruled 
Portugal from 1926 to 1974 and which included the construction of large infrastructure 
works as part of its political propaganda and developmental programmes. Some of the 
most strategic hydropower plants were built in the river basin by the national state during 
this period, such as Picote (1958), Miranda do Douro (1960) and Bemposta (1964), all of 
which benefited from financial and technical support provided by the United States 
through the Marshall Plan (Rollo, 2008). Powerful state agencies were organised to 
oversee water regulation, in particular the Hydraulic Services General Directory in 1949 
and the Basic Sanitation General Directory in 1973. 
 
 





The third phase was the short transitional period (1986-1993), when the national 
legal framework, as well as wider economic and social life, started to change with 
Portugal joining the European Union. This phase was characterised by administrative and 
engineering solutions, especially the formation of a new regulatory agency in 1990, the 
National Water Institute (INAG), and the construction of new dams and pipelines, 
increasingly making use of European funds (Thiel, 2010). A growing number of 
academic and non-academic publications began to emphasise the importance of ‘modern’ 
water management, in particular economic instruments based on the polluter-pays 
principle (e.g. Miranda, 1986). Since 1985, the Crestuma-Lever Reservoir, located at 21.6 
km from the mouth of the Douro, became the main source of freshwater for the 
approximately two million inhabitants of the Porto region (it is important to note that, 
paradoxically, the Crestuma-Lever Dam also reduced river flow and, as a result, 
increased the rate of salinity in Zebreiros, which affected the overall production of 
potable water). The first tourist boat started to operate in the Douro in 1986 and since 
then the industry has grown significantly (from 63,042 passengers in 1997 to 167,983 in 
2003, according to CCDR-N, 2004). 
 
 
Figure 4 – Boat passage at the Crestuma-Lever dam and the Lever water treatment plant. 
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The fourth phase was characterised by water service liberalisation and river basin 
plans (1993-2005). According to Queirós (2002), this was the moment when Portugal 
made significant progress in revising the national environmental regulatory framework 
(largely but not solely in response to European Union directives), in strengthening its 
environmental institutions (including the Ministry of Environment, Spatial Planning and 
Regional Development) and in developing national environmental planning (e.g. its first 
national environmental plan, in 1995). At the same time, Decree No. 379 was issued in 
1993 and provided the legal basis for the gradual concentration of water services in 
regional companies (that was part of a movement from dispersed to concentrated sources 
of water supply, a tendency that has increased in more recent years). In 1994, a series of 
additional decrees reorganised the regulation of water use in the country: No. 45 (on river 
basin plans), No. 46 (water user licence) and No. 47 (tariffs based on the volumetric use 
of water). The National Water Council and various river basin councils, including one for 
the Douro, were established during this phase, but these were mainly advisory boards 
formed almost entirely by civil servants (rather than representatives of water users and 
civil society). The Douro river basin plan was adopted in October 2001 by the national 
government (see INAG, 2001), but it was only marginally implemented due to the lack of 
means and political appetite to produce major changes in established management 
practices. Other plans to revitalise the regional economy included initiatives related to the 
management of freshwater resources, such as new hydropower dams, fluvial tourism and 
the expansion of the water supply and sanitation network (CCDR-N, 2006). 
The fifth and current phase entails the implementation of the Water Framework 
Directive, which started with the approval of the new Water Law in 2005 (that translated 
the WFD into Portuguese legislation). As has happened throughout the European Union, 
the new legal framework created a unique opportunity to reformulate water management 
practices and a search for responses to old and new problems in Portugal (Vlachos, 
2003). Moreover, the transposition of the European Directive has not been without 
delays. In the first instance, Portugal was one of the countries that more promptly 
transposed WFD into national law, but later there were some problems with reporting the 
characterisation of water bodies, as determined by Article 5 of the Directive (Kanakoudis 
and Tsitsifli, 2011). In June 2008, the so-called ‘financial-economic regime’ was 
introduced, including the payment of bulk water charges that are supposed to induce use 
efficiency and pollution reduction (D’Alte, 2008). Any significant use of surface and 
groundwater now requires formal authorisation and attracts a charge (see more below). In 
October 2008, a new water regulatory agency was established, the North Portugal 
Hydrological Region Administration (ARHN). ARNH was called upon to assist in the 
planning and execution of regulations and measures for the implementation of sustainable 
water management.  
 
The WFD regime and the provision of public water services 
 
In 2009, ARHN started to prepare river basin management plans for the northern 
region of Portugal. According to the WFD timetable, such plans should have been ready 
for public consultation in 2009 (to allow the mitigation measures to be in place by 2012), 
but the political and economic context caused significant disruption, especially after the 
2008 global financial crisis that affected Portugal particularly hard. The Douro River 
Basin plan was eventually published and public consultation was scheduled to take place 
between October 2011 and April 2012. The plan is a compilation of vast amounts of data, 
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summarised in various volumes, and provides an overview of the catchment, the 
ecological status of water bodies, anthropogenic pressures and recommended solutions 
(ARHN, 2011). Out of 353 surface water bodies, 71% are in good ecological status, 
whereas in 22% of the water bodies the condition is moderate, 6% is poor and 1% is bad; 
in terms of river extension, that means 3,034 km of good ecological status and 2,079 km 
of less than good (or 41% of the total river extension; note that the length of the water 
bodies is not identical).  
The most relevant problems described are the impacts taking place in Spain 
(which deteriorates water quality and reduces 14% of the river flow), localised water 
scarcity situations along the catchment, contamination by nitrogen, phosphorous and 
organic matter (among other pollutants), soil erosion, and the insufficiency of 
hydrological data and the weak enforcement of existing environmental legislation 
(ARHN, 2011). To recover the ecological status of surface, subterraneous, coastal and 
artificial water bodies in the Douro, the plan recommended 215 mitigation measures that 
would require € 458.5 million. Of that total, € 374.5 million would be needed for the 
period 2009-2015 and € 84 million after 2015. 71% of the measures are related to water 
quality and 17% with water scarcity problems (more technical information, including 
maps and statistics, are available in ARHN, 2011). 
It should be noted that the reform of public water services in the Douro has 
happened in parallel with the introduction of the WFD. The river basin still has a highly 
fragmented water industry, with numerous small, localised companies serving only part 
of the municipal territory and suffering from high operational costs and limited 
investment capacity (Alves, 2005; Martins, 1998). The large number of public service 
providers follows the historical delegation of responsibilities to municipal and sub-
municipal administration. Since the approval of new legislation in the third period 
mentioned above (Law 379/1993), there has been a partial movement towards the 
consolidation of high services in regional entities, which are supposed to provide 
economies of scale and rationalise water abstraction at the regional level. Drinking water 
production (abstraction and treatment), called ‘high services’, and retail water distribution 
(supply of water to households and commercial customers), called ‘low services’, are 
separated. In the Douro, there are currently 124 high service and 139 low service 
companies (ARHN, 2011). There are also two utilities with intermunicipal coverage: 
Águas do Douro and Paiva (serving the Porto metropolitan area) and Água de Trás-os-
Montes and Alto Douro (in the upper river basin). Significantly, the reorganisation of the 
water industry has created important opportunities for private business, especially 
through public-private partnerships and outsourcing, operation and maintenance contracts 
(IRAR, 2008). But the restructuring of the water industry in the last two decades has not 
guaranteed universal service provision in the river basin, given that the rate of water 
supply coverage is 92% and sanitation is still 83% (ARHN, 2011). The dilemmas faced 
when attempted to modernise the water industry in the Douro are closely connected with 
the intricacies and contradictory goals of the WFD. These difficulties will now be 
discussed.    
 
THE NEW WATER REGULATION IN THE DOURO: CHANGES AND 




The changes in approach to water regulation in the Douro River Basin have 
closely followed the politicised interconnections between local processes, national 
politics and European integration. In that context, the introduction of the WFD has 
accelerated the trend of institutional reforms that started in previous decades (at least 
since 1986). With the approval of the 2005 Water Law, a series of events and regular 
media coverage have helped to broaden the discussion about the need to improve the 
basis of water use and conservation in the Douro (Ioris, 2008b). However, there has been 
a noticeable mismatch between discourse and practice, which suggests the existence of 
deeper obstacles to improving state regulation and water policy-making. This requires 
further examination. Before doing so, it is relevant to mention that the foregoing 
overview of the evolution of water use and regulation clearly illustrates our initial 
observation that the state apparatus cannot be considered a purely technical and 
administrative entity. On the contrary, the water regulation advanced by the Portuguese 
State has had major consequences for regional development and socionatural relations in 
the Douro. And vice-versa: water management problems and the reaction of various 
social groups have influenced the preparation and implementation of policy responses.  
To a large extent, the official rhetoric of innovation and creative water 
management advanced by the Portuguese State regarding the WFD has been 
systematically narrowed down to calls for higher levels of operational and economic 
efficiency. The search for water efficiency is often described as a ‘win-win’ game that 
can, in theory, lower the level of water demand and effluent discharge (Cunha et al., 
2007). The main focus on water efficiency is betrayed in the argument of Professor 
Francisco Nunes Correia – the Secretary of State for the Environment between 2005 and 
2009 – for whom the Water Framework Directive is essentially a matter of cost reduction 
and efficient water use. For instance, in June 2008, at the opening session of the National 
Association of Portuguese Municipalities, the minister argued that:  
 
“Not all the water abstracted [in Portugal] is effectively utilised, given that an 
important proportion is associated with inefficient use and losses. (…) There are 
various reasons to take the efficient use of water as a strategic goal. First of all, there is 
a growing consciousness in society that water resources are limited and, thus, it is 
necessary to protect and conserve (…). [Another reason] is the economic interest at the 
national level, inasmuch as potential savings related to water correspond to significant 
figures, estimated at around 0.64% of national GDP (…) The efficient use of water is 
still important regarding the rationalisation of investments, to the extent that it allows a 
better use of existing infrastructure, reducing or even avoiding the need to increase 
water abstraction systems (…). The efficient use of water corresponds to the economic 
interest of the citizens, to the extent that makes possible a reduction in the costs of 
water use.” 1 
 
 The technocratic connection between efficiency, private gains and water 
management should come as no surprise, given that the minister has himself been one of 
the champions of the water reforms under the new paradigm of efficiency and economic 
rationality (Correia, 2000). The prevailing emphasis on efficiency gains has fundamental 
                                                 
1 The argument that environmental benefits will be necessarily obtained from a more efficient use of water 
obviously ignores the fact that increases in efficiency are minimised by additional water demands that, in 
the end, can magnify the level of environmental impacts (what is famously described as the ‘Jevons 
Paradox’).  
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consequences in terms of the symbolism associated with the implementation of the WFD 
in Portugal. The perception of the WFD regulation being primarily connected with 
economic factors was summarised in one interview as “the pure philosophy of 
mercantilism, a speculation with water, rather than attempts to reduce its use” (interview 
with a farmer, 17 Nov 2008). At the end of the day, the public debate on water 
management reforms in Portugal and in the Douro has been colonised by the persistent 
association of water with economic (monetary) results and commodity exchange, which 
is vividly illustrated in Figure 2.  
 
 
Figure 5 – Poster of a public event (Expo-Água 2008) describing water as a commodity 
(in the centre, it says in Portuguese: "Water: The next top commodity; Anticipate the 
future, take the lead in the present") 
 
 The same economic rationality and monetary symbolism that underpin the 
introduction of the new water legislation are related to the application of bulk water 
charges (i.e. charges levied on the use of raw water). According to the WFD, water use 
requires prior licensing and must attract monetary charges equivalent to its likely level of 
ecological impacts (Del Saz-Salazar et al., 2009). In Portugal, after years of intense 
disagreement, bulk water charges were formally introduced in 2008 (called taxa de 
recursos hídricos) and are calculated taking into account the volumes of water abstracted 
and effluent discharge, and also the extraction of inert material, land use area, public 
water projects and the level of regional water scarcity (the methodology and rationale of 
the charging scheme can be found in http://www.arhnorte.pt). Half of the income from 
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charges in the Douro goes to pay for 2/3 of ARHN’s operational costs and the rest goes to 
a national fund that helps to support environment restoration measures (refer to the 
previous section for ARHN’s role and responsibilities). 
It is important to point out that, although the economic component of the WFD 
has been highly controversial in the Douro and elsewhere in the country, local water 
regulators and the technical staff of ARNH contacted during our research expressed 
concern about the negative repercussions of bulk water charges and systematic calls for 
efficiency. At a personal level, regulators seem quite aware of the difficulties in engaging 
stakeholders of the Douro and of the shortcomings of policies centred on the expression 
of the economic value of water. For instance, in interviews with two senior officials of 
ARHN (03 Nov 2008), thorny negotiations to approve the water charging scheme and the 
serious uncertainties about the best way to introduce new regulatory practices were 
explicitly mentioned. The very language used in ARHN publications reveals a more 
careful handling of bulk water charges and monetary valuation than the national 
publications produced by INAG, which is the national water regulator (e.g. Brito et al., 
2008). However, this more cautious approach at the local regulatory team (which slightly 
contrasts with the stronger emphasis on the commodification of water by the national 
agency) has not prevented the introduction of bulk water charges from becoming the most 
contentious chapter of the new water regulatory regime in the Douro. 
 
Reaction from the farming sector 
 
Agriculture is probably the water user sector that best encapsulates the anxieties 
associated with the new water charges and the WFD in general. According to ARHN 
(2011), there are 104,670 hectares under irrigation in the Douro catchment, the great 
majority being small, intensive farming units located between Porto and Vila Real. These 
farmers have been criticised in official documents as being responsible for the highest 
rate of water demand and the lowest rates of user efficiency (e.g. INAG, 2005). As a 
result, the payment for bulk water charges was justified by the government as a 
mechanism that can ‘steer the behaviour’ of the water users (as declared by government 
representatives in a seminar organised by the Portuguese Farmers Confederation on 08 
July 2008). However, the farming sector protested that there is no reason for the bulk 
water charges in Portugal to be three times higher than equivalent figures in France or to 
be adopted two years earlier than in Spain (i.e. 2008 in Portugal and 2010 in Spain).2 In 
our meetings with corporate and family farmers, both groups were unanimous in 
complaining about the charges, which was seen as an extra burden being placed upon a 
sector that is already under serious pressure due to declining governmental support and 
the reform of the Common Agriculture Policy. Some blame northern European countries, 
where irrigation is less critical, for formulating a piece of ‘draconian’ legislation such as 
the WDF. Farmers also mentioned that, opposing the official discourse, there is limited 
room for improving efficiency (at least at low costs), since they are the first to want to 
                                                 
2 In the Spanish section of the Douro the controversy about volumetric charges to agriculture has also 
dominated public discussion about the new water regulation. The use of water in the river basin is claimed 
to be one of the least efficient in Spain, which was used as justification for further modernization and 
higher efficiency goals (Gómez-Limón and Gómez-Ramos, 2007). As in Portugal, there is a suggestion that 
water pricing could influence farmers to invest in better equipment and in rainfed crops (Gómez-Limón and 
Martínez, 2006). However, because of the declining profitability of agriculture in Spain, bulk charges are 
likely to mainly affect farmers who want to start irrigating their land (Gómez-Limón, pers. commun.). 
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save water and reduce operational costs associated with electricity and irrigation 
equipment (which they claim to have done already).  
In an interview with a representative of the corporate farming sector (21 Nov 
2008), it was declared that: 
 
“Water has a huge ‘value’ for the farmers, but it should not have a monetary ‘price’. 
(...) I consider a distortion of competition the application of a new fee on water used by 
agriculture in the Mediterranean countries. Why? Well, if you live in Scotland, or in 
Brussels, you have much higher and more frequent precipitation, whilst in Portugal it 
rains less and for shorter periods of time. A farmer in Portugal has to invest in water 
storage and pipelines, pay for the irrigation equipment, energy and in ten years has to 
replace the equipment. The costs are very high and already restrain water use. In this 
context, in comes the European Union and says, ‘we all need to pay for water in order 
to improve efficiency and environmental quality. (…) The farmers don’t need to pay 
for water to use it more efficiently… You know, the farmer already has a deep 
relationship with the water cycle. Now, the main risk is that this charge becomes 
[merely] a new tax that will not contribute to improving the environment. (…) I 
strongly believe that in situations of water scarcity the user should pay less, not more 
for water”. 
 
In turn, representatives from the family farmers interviewed for this research 
project protested that the water charges were adopted in Portugal before the definition of 
environmental management and mitigation targets (which only happened in 2011), which 
for them serves to demonstrate that the new water policies are in fact about the 
commercialisation of water and not the protection of nature. The following interview 
extract summarises the feeling among the small, family farmer:  
 
“[M]any times the farmers and the agriculture sector are seen as reckless users of water. 
These discussions fail to consider the reality of Portuguese agriculture, as well as 
ignoring the deep, even passionate, relationship of the farmer with water (…) [T]his 
law liberates the state from the responsibility to look after the conservation of water, 
given that it leaves it open to the market. About the social relevance of water, little or 
nothing is said. (…) [the consequences of the new charges] are inevitably the increase 
in production costs and, as a result, the elimination of those that don’t have the 
financial means to pay for it” (CNA, 2006). 
 
The water industry 
 
While the introduction of bulk water charges stirred the reaction of small and 
large farmers to the WFD, a similar argument arose between regulators and operators of 
water supply and sanitation utilities. Despite the fact that a full utility privatisation (i.e. 
divestiture) seems temporarily off the political agenda3, it has been repeatedly affirmed in 
official documents that the introduction of the WFD must be associated with stronger 
cost-recovery measures (through higher water service charges) and ‘private sector-like’ 
management of public utilities (including public-private collaboration). In particular, 
local water providers (‘low service’ companies) are blamed for their backward thinking 
                                                 
3 Public utility privatisation was removed from the agenda, in large measure, because of intense public 
opposition. However, the worsening financial crisis led to the fall of the socialist cabinet in 2011 and the 
election of a centre-right government, which has expressed a renewed interest in utility privatisation. 
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which has been a “hindrance to the development of water supply sector” (that is the 
expression used on the cover page of the main professional magazine about water 
services in Portugal, Água and Ambiente, in June 2005). Claims for cost recovery have 
also provoked disputes and uneasiness between the various water utilities that operate in 
the same geographical area (i.e. the ‘high’ and ‘low’ service companies). For example, in 
2008 the municipal company formed to serve the city of Porto (Águas do Porto) was able 
to reduce the purchase of water from the Águas do Douro and Paiva by 80,000 m3/day 
(out of a total of 280,000 m3 distributed daily), according to its chief-manager (interview 
on 14 Nov 2008). That corresponds to a net saving of € 216,000/month in terms of 
payment made to the regional company or around 12% of its income (in 2008). As a 
result, Águas do Douro and Paiva tried unsuccessfully to raise their tariffs by 8% in 2008, 
but the government only allowed an increase of 5.5% [note that the national rate of 
inflation in the year 2008 was 2.7%, much lower than the increases in tariffs].  
A large company such as Águas do Porto may be able to confront the 
intermunicipal water authority (Águas do Douro and Paiva), but other municipal 
organisations are left in a much weaker position to negotiate costs and conditions with the 
regional water utilities. In our interviews with managers, engineers and politicians 
responsible for the water services in the cities and towns in the upper Douro, we detected 
a considerable level of resentment about the pressures exerted by the central government 
in favour of the regionalisation of the service. Some municipalities that started to buy 
water from the regional companies are even contemplating a return to local water 
abstraction and treatment operations, exactly the opposite of the national policies for the 
sector. It was mentioned that the purchase of water from the intermunicipal company 
normally costs more than twice the local costs of abstraction and treatment. Part of this 
difference can be explained by the investments made by the larger company to comply 
with European Union drinking water legislation, something that many local authorities 
have failed to observe. It is also the case that local water operators faced major political 
barriers to transfer higher service charges to the population and that has led to growing 
protest and, in some cases, physical violence (as in the invasion of the Peso da Régua 
Council in 2002). Regardless of public complaints, domestic water tariffs have increased 
further after the introduction of bulk water charges, but domestic charges have shown a 
low elasticity price-demand and, ultimately, a modest influence on the level of water 
demand (Monteiro and Roseta-Palma, 2007). 
In practice, tariffs are now only marginally higher than before the WFD for the 
majority of the water utilities customers (i.e. the impact of the WFD charges on each 
household is relatively low, estimated at around € 0.20 per month, which corresponds to 
2.5-3.0% of the average tariff, according to the information provided on the website of 
the Douro water utilities). This discrepancy between opposition towards WFD charges 
and real financial impact seems to suggest that the negative reaction is not about the 
financial levy per se but it is rather an expression of scepticism and mistrust in relation to 
new water policies. The negative reaction of farmers and household water users suggests 
a significant distance between the apparently consensual goals of the WFD regime and 
the actual involvement of the river basin population in the regulation of collective water 
issues. On the one hand, Barreira (2003) argues that the willingness of stakeholders to 
engage in water management has been historically very low in Portugal (as in Spain). On 
the other hand, however, our empirical results showed a more complex picture and a 
discernible frustration with the lack of opportunity to effectively influence the 
implementation of the new Directive. The involvement of the public has remained largely 
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restricted to consultations and formalised activities that offer little transparency and 
produce limited impact on decision-making (Veiga et al., 2008). In particular, the round 
of meetings organised in 2007-2008 by the national government to discuss the new 
legislation ended up being something of a ‘big imbroglio’ because it has been limited to a 
small number of participants and merely ratified decisions made in advance (interview 
with a NGO activist, 19 Nov 2008). 
 
The lasting controversy over dams 
 
A series of coordinated protests have emerged against the construction of large 
dams in the Douro, given that the introduction of the WFD has not prevented the 
approval of large engineering projects. Six new large hydropower schemes (out of ten in 
the whole of Portugal) are planned for the Douro, according to the National Programme 
of Dams with High Hydroelectric Potential (INAG, 2007). The new dams are part of the 
attempt to secure 60% of Portuguese electricity from renewable sources by 2020, which 
was confirmed by the previous Prime Minister José Sócrates in a public event when he 
stated that “Portugal is the European country with most hydropower reserves to be 
exploited” (RTP News, 20 Nov 2008). As one of the main organised groups, the 
Citizenship Movement for the Development of the Tâmega River (a tributary of the 
Douro) has challenged the activities of the energy companies (the Portuguese EDP and 
the Spanish Iberdrola) involved in the construction of the Fridão Dam. The controversy 
about an impoundment planned in the River Côa in the 1990s and firmly resisted because 
of the impact on archaeological sites with rupestrian paintings is still vividly present in 
the memory of the local residents. Apart from environmental impacts caused by dams in 
the Douro (Azevedo, 1998; Bordalo et al., 2006; Sabater et al., 2009), there is a feeling 
among the local residents that the hydropower schemes built in recent decades have 
contributed little to improve the life of the communities in the river basin. After 
construction, the operation of the dams only creates a small number of jobs in the region 
and brings marginal financial contribution to local communities (cf. our interviews with 
residents and city councillors). The fact that most of the electricity generated in the Douro 
is then transferred elsewhere, mainly to the south of Portugal, reinforces a sense of dual 
citizenship between the coast and the interior.  
Probably the largest and most emblematic mobilisation has been against the new 
dam in the River Sabor, a large structure (123 metres high) that will flood 2,820 hectares 
and also destroy several archaeological sites (see Figure 3 regarding a protest event in 
April 2008). In 2009, the European Parliament received a formal complaint against the 
dam by a collation of local organisations (called Plataforma Sabor Livre), which was 
then dismissed (allegedly due to the pressures of the President of the European 
Commission Durão Barroso, a former prime minister of Portugal). The anti-dam activists 
systematically expressed their grave concerns with what they see as ‘serious mistakes’ 
during the preparation of the environmental impact assessment (interview with NGO 
activist, 19 Nov 2008). Despite the likely impact on important conservation reserves 
(even acknowledged in the EIA conducted by the electricity company Portugal Energies 
(EdP), which was privatised in 1999), the government gave the go-ahead for the project 





Figure 6 – Leaflet promoting mobilisation against the Sabor Dam 
(it says in Portuguese: "III Summit: For the Protection of the Sabor River, April 2008, in 
the municipalities of Mogadouro and Alfândega da Fé") 
 
THE PROSPECTS OF WATER REGULATION IN THE DOURO 
 
 The contested bases of the introduction of the Water Framework Directive in the 
Douro River Basin demonstrate the significant distance between responses formulated at 
the high level of European governance and how social actors interpret and negotiate the 
new regulation on the ground. If the economic agenda of the WFD seems to dominate the 
public debate, there remain serious questions about the effectiveness of the new 
regulation and the mitigation of environmental risks. Notwithstanding legal and 
discursive improvements, the long-term causes of water problems – namely, political 
pressures for maximising the economic outcomes and minimising the investments in 
social equity and environmental conservation – have been largely left out of the process 
of regulatory change. In addition, the limited availability of long-term monitoring data 
and of detailed technical studies has contributed to increase the uncertainties about the 
new water regulation. In the end, despite its important innovations, the new regulatory 
regime in Portugal has reinforced the existing pattern of uneven gains and losses. 
Attempts to improve water management in the catchment under the WFD regime have 
often revived long-established asymmetries and the inconsistencies of public policies 
related to the allocation, use and conservation of shared resources. The new water 
regulation has become an multilayered arena of disputes, where some groups 
(construction companies, hydroelectricity companies, large water companies, etc.) have 
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benefited more than others (farmers, urban water customers, communities that continue to 
be affected by large engineering schemes).  
 In terms of the prospects of water regulation in the Douro, without a more critical 
reassessment of the possibilities and barriers of the WFD regulation in the light of local 
and national politics, past mistakes are likely to be repeated. Public water policies are the 
result of multiple forms of interaction between social groups and their shared water 
system. The crux of the matter is that the regulatory regime introduced by the WFD has 
been contained by the internal contradictions and political susceptibilities of the national 
state. More than technical and administrative procedures, the reform of water regulation 
under the new Directive has represented an invaluable opportunity to reaffirm the 
authority of the state and its territorial power. The problem is beyond the level of 
individual regulators and their relation with the new institutional demands, but it is 
fundamentally a question of the bureaucratic rationality and political commitments of the 
state apparatus. One needs to necessarily address the politicised geography of water 
regulation to understand the fluidity of policies and the ambiguity of the official 
discourse. As observed by Habermas (2001, in Eckersley, 2004), the democratic deficit in 
the European Union can only be bridged when citizens share a sense of European identity 
and see themselves as the authors and addresses of a truly European law. In the end, 
without a more democratic and responsible dialogue with local social groups, any change 
in the regulation is likely to fall into the same ‘institutional trap' that has limited the 
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